ExcerptThere are a number of ways of considering the current crisis in Western universities and, in particular, their problems with ideas and practices about truth and truthfulness. One is to see it as a problem created by what is often termed “modernity,” which is to say the issues raised and the processes set in motion by the Enlightenment and the various reactions to it in the West. Going down this road invariably means invoking modern thinkers, ranging from Nietzsche to Weber (...) to Foucault, all of whom provide considerable insight into the way in which certain ideas in the West have…. (shrink)

ExcerptIt can be argued that we are currently living in a time characterized by a widespread perception of “discontinuity,” of a rupture in historical continuity. This rupture appears to have been brought about by the alleged demise of the secular paradigm, underpinning the Enlightenment project of modernity, caused by the outbreak of religious fervor and spirituality at the dawn of the new millennium. The perceived rupture in the natural progression of secular modernity has led to the questioning of the assumed (...) link of modernity and secularity1 and to the critique of Enlightenment theories and postulates regarding the disenchantment of the…. (shrink)

Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can’t be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it’s possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can (...) play a role in bringing about belief without being a motivating reason for belief, thereby leaving room for practical considerations to serve as motivating reasons. I present two ways in which this can happen. First, agents can use evidence as a mere means by which to believe, with practical considerations serving as motivating reasons for belief, just as we use tools (e.g. a brake pedal) as mere means by which to do something (e.g. slow down) which we are motivated to do for practical reasons. Second, evidence can make it possible for one to choose whether or not to believe – a choice one can then make for practical reasons. These arguments push the debate between the evidentialist and the pragmatist into new territory. It is no longer enough for an evidentialist to insist that belief is impossible without evidence. Even if this is right, the outcome of the debate remains unsettled. It will hang on the ability of the evidentialist to respond to the new pragmatist strategy presented here. (shrink)

Focal brain metabolic effects detected by proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) represent prospective indices of clinical status and guides to treatment design. Sampling bilateral pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pACC), anterior middle cingulate cortex (aMCC), and thalamus in 40 adult patients and 16 healthy controls, we examined relationships of the neurometabolites glutamate+glutamine (Glx), creatine+phosphocreatine (Cr), and choline-compounds (Cho) with OCD diagnosis and multiple symptom types. The latter included OC core symptoms (Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale - YBOCS), depressive symptoms (...) (Montgomery-Åsberg Depression Rating Scale - MADRS), and general functioning (Global Assessment Scale - GAS). pACC Glx was 9.7% higher in patients than controls. Within patients, Cr and Cho correlated negatively with YBOCS and MADRS, while Cr correlated positively with the GAS. In aMCC, Cr and Cho correlated negatively with MADRS, while Cr in thalamus correlated positively with GAS. These findings present moderate support for glutamatergic and cingulocentric perspectives on OCD. Based on our prior metabolic model of OCD, we offer one possible interpretation of these group and correlational effects as consequences of a corticothalamic state of elevated glutamatergic receptor activity alongside below-normal glutamatergic transporter activity. (shrink)

In this paper, I describe and criticize M.G.F. Martin's version of disjunctivism, and his argument for it from premises about self-knowledge.

The canonical Bayesian solution to the ravens paradox faces a problem: it entails that black non-ravens disconfirm the hypothesis that all ravens are black. I provide a new solution that avoids this problem. On my solution, black ravens confirm that all ravens are black, while non-black non-ravens and black non-ravens are neutral. My approach is grounded in certain relations of epistemic dependence, which, in turn, are grounded in the fact that the kind raven is more natural than the kind black. (...) The solution applies to any generalization “All F’s are G” in which F is more natural than G. (shrink)

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

During the last couple of decades, so called representationalist theories of mind have gained increased popularity. These theories describe mental states in terms of representations of external objects and states of affairs. It is also often held that the content of a subject’s thoughts and perceptions is determined by facts outside her mind, such as social relations between her and other people and causal relations between her and external objects. Some representationalists even argue that the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences (...) is determined by external factors in the sense that the truth conditions of statements like: “it looks blue” involve such facts. This entails that so called “phenomenal properties” such as colours are not properties of my experiences or even determined by such properties. This thesis has been labelled “phenomenal externalism” by e.g., Fred Dretske1 and William Lycan2. Introspection has traditionally been described as a subject’s immediate awareness of her own experiences. It has been assumed that the subject has a special and privileged access to her experiences which means that she cannot be mistaken either about the content of her beliefs and experiences or about what they feel like to her. A long lived theory about introspection is that the introspective process is similar to perception, only the objects of the introspective process are “inner” instead of “outer”. This model seems to entail that experiences also share relevant similarities with external objects, such as having intrinsic properties, properties the subject is aware of when observing the objects in question. (shrink)

One kind of substantial critique which has been raised by several philosophers against the so called higher order perception theory , advocated for mainly by William Lycan, concerns the combination of two important claims: that qualia are wide contents of perceptual experiences, and that the subject becomes aware of what the world is like by perceiving her own experiences of the world. In what sense could we possibly watch our own mental states if they are representations whose content and qualitative (...) character is determined by factors that are external to the mind? And, furthermore, how can we become aware of what the world is like by means of this process? Fred Dretske says that all we could become aware of by this alleged activity are activities of the nervous system. But being aware of what e.g., a certain colour is like to us, does not seem to be the same as being aware of what a particular nervous activation pattern is like to us. Barry Maund points out that it is not ruled out that the representational vehicle and the representational object share some properties, nor that it is in virtue of having certain properties that a mental state has the content it does. If it were the case that the properties of the representational states showed some iconic resemblance relation to that which they represent, there could perhaps be some point in watching them. But again, we have little reason for thinking that this is the case. It seems improbable that an experience of red would be red, i.e., that the representational vehicle would have these properties. The important issue is: what features could the representational vehicle possibly have that would make it suitable as an object for inner sense and, in turn, would enable us to become aware of what it is like for us to perceive external objects by “looking” at the representation of these objects? I will explore these questions in this paper. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.3 (2002) 287-288 [Access article in PDF] Investigating Depersonalization Filip Radovic and Susanna Radovic The comments offered by Morris and Modigh in this issue give us an opportunity to clarify some of the views and topics discussed in our paper.One of Morris' objections is that we on some occasions characterize depersonalization complaints in a way that indicate delusion. Although one of the criteria of (...) depersonalization syndrome is intact reality testing (APA 2000), it is nevertheless the case that patients with depersonalization complaints may at the same time be delusional, a fact that Modigh also points out: "The border between unreality feelings with largely intact reality-testing ability and psychotic disorders with grossly disturbed reality-testing is, however, not absolute and patients with psychotic disorders may of course experience feelings of unreality or depersonalization."Morris is also critical of the idea that feelings of unreality in the quasi-sensory sense (or in sense [a3]) may tempt patients to doubt the reality of the items experienced as unreal. We suggest that the experience of the self or the world as unreal may actually give rise to an impulse to believe that the self or the world does not exist. This, however, need not imply that a person who has such a belief is delusional. For example, consider the following cases, which include patients with intense unreality feelings but who exhibit largely intact reality testing. One of Sierra and Berrios' (2000) patients says: "I have to touch myself to make sure that I have a body and a real existence." Lindqvist (1966, p. 171) describes two cases of the "mirror syndrome," which he recognizes as a typical behavior seen in cases of severe depersonalization. The patients want to confirm that they are real by looking in a mirror. Such cases strongly indicate that a person with otherwise intact reality testing can be so overwhelmed by feelings of unreality that he or she can come to doubt his or her own existence. The reason we do not want to call this state delusional is that the patient constantly tries to compare the experience of reality with some other mark of reality (e.g., by using a mirror), thus indicating that, on a higher cognitive level, he or she still understands that his or her belief may be incorrect. The image in the mirror works as an assurance that the fear of not existing is, after all, just a fear.Merleau-Ponty's (1962) description of Stratton's inverting spectacles experiment is indeed relevant to our analysis. The experiment seems to indicate that the feeling of unreality corresponds to the degree of unfamiliarity with seeing the world upside down. Stratton's subjects report that after a couple of days objects still appear inverted but less unreal than they did before. This seems to suggest that unreal in this circumstance approximates not normal. An inverted world is after some time accepted as normal. (See also note 3 in our paper.)Let us conclude with a few comments on an important methodological issue. Our methodological [End Page 287] approach is not equivalent with a classical ordinary language approach because our main concern is language use in psychiatric contexts. A classical ordinary language analysis aims to explicate how terms actually are used in everyday language; our primary concern is to try to understand the phenomenology underlying descriptions of felt unreality given by patients suffering from depersonalization. However, we do start by looking at the terms from an everyday angle, but this only gives us a coarse approximation of what the depersonalization patient may mean by such expressions. The strange and unpleasant phenomenology of the condition in combination with the variety of characteristic expressions make it likely that the role of unreal in connection with depersonalization complaints is quite different from its use in everyday language. When a person undergoes a depersonalization episode for the first time, he or she encounters a quite new and perhaps unexpected phenomenological reality. When the person attempts to describe these perplexing feelings he or she, naturally, uses terms found in everyday language, but the changed... (shrink)

Patients with insomnia complain of problems with sleep onset or sleep maintenance or early morning awakenings, or a combination of these, despite adequate opportunity and circumstances for sleep. In addition, to fulfill the diagnostic criteria for insomnia the complaints need to be associated with negative daytime consequences. For chronic insomnia, the symptoms are required to be present at least 3 days per week for a duration of at least 3 months. Lastly, for insomnia to be defined as a disorder, the (...) sleep complaints and daytime symptoms should not be better explained by another sleep disorder. This criterion represents a diagnostic challenge, since patients suffering from other sleep disorders often complain of insomnia symptoms. For instance, insomnia symptoms are common in e.g., obstructive sleep apnea and circadian rhythm sleep-wake disorders. It may sometimes be difficult to disentangle whether the patient suffers from insomnia disorder or whether the insomnia symptoms are purely due to another sleep disorder. Furthermore, insomnia disorder may be comorbid with other sleep disorders in some patients, e.g., comorbid insomnia and sleep apnea. In addition, insomnia disorder is often comorbid with psychological or somatic disorders and diseases. Thus, a thorough assessment is necessary for correct diagnostics. For chronic insomnia disorder, treatment-of-choice is cognitive behavioral therapy, and such treatment is also effective when the insomnia disorder appears comorbid with other diagnoses. Furthermore, studies suggest that insomnia is a heterogenic disorder with many different phenotypes or subtypes. Different insomnia subtypes may respond differently to treatment, but more research on this issue is warranted. Also, the role of comorbidity on treatment outcome is understudied. This review is part of a Research Topic on insomnia launched by Frontiers and focuses on diagnostic and treatment challenges of the disorder. The review aims to stimulate to more research into the bidirectional associations and interactions between insomnia disorder and other sleep, psychological, and somatic disorders/diseases. (shrink)

Beall’s (e.g., 2009, 2021) transparency theory of truth is recognized as a prominent, deflationist solution to the liar paradox. However, it has been neglected by truth theorists who have attempted to show that a deflationist theory of truth can (or cannot) account for truth dependence, i.e., the claim that the truth of a proposition depends on how things described by the proposition are, but how these things are does not depend on the truth of the proposition. Truth theorists interested in (...) truth dependence have, instead, been focused on Horwich’s Minimalism (e.g., 1998). The goal of this paper is twofold. First, I construct what versions of the transparency theory would say about truth dependence. Second, I argue that even the best version of transparent truth ultimately fails to account for truth dependence. On the assumption that accounting for truth dependence is an adequacy condition on any theory of truth, the paper rejects transparency theory as an adequate theory of truth. (shrink)

ObjectiveCochlear explantation for purely elective (e.g. psychological and emotional) reasons is not well studied. Herein, we aim to provide data and expert commentary about elective cochlear implant (CI) removal that may help to guide clinical decision-making and formulate guidelines related to CI explantation.Data sourcesWe address these objectives via three approaches: case report of a patient who desired elective CI removal; review of literature and expert discussion by surgeon, audiologist, bioethicist, CI user and member of Deaf community.Review methodsA systematic review using (...) three scientific online databases was performed. Included articles addressed the benefits and/or complications of cochlear implantation in young children, CI explantation with or without revision surgery and the ethical debate between the medical and Deaf communities on cochlear implantation and explantation.ConclusionsThe medical and audiological perspectives identify a host of risks related to implant removal without reimplantation, including risk from surgery, general anaesthesia, cochlear ossification and poor audiometric outcomes. The member of the deaf community and bioethicist argue that physicians need to guide the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and patient autonomy. Taken together, patient desires should be seen as paramount, if the patient is otherwise fit for surgery and well informed.Implications for practiceSimilar to the case of device implantation, device explantation should be a multidisciplinary and collaborative decision with the patient and the family’s desires at the centre. While every case is different, we offer a CI explantation discussion to assist in clinical decision-making, patient counselling and education. (shrink)

Susanna Siegel argues that visual contents are rich: visual experiences represent a variety of properties, over and above mere colors and shapes, including, notably, kind properties, e.g., the property of being a pine tree. To argue her case, she makes use of the method of phenomenal contrasts, which involves choosing among different explanatory hypotheses to account for phenomenal contrasts between relevant experiences. I will argue that there is reason to question whether the method of phenomenal contrasts is suitable for (...) establishing that kind properties are represented in visual experiences, insofar as the method draws upon first-person intuitions eclectically. (shrink)

H G WellsHerbert George Wells, an English writer, was born on 21st 1866 and died on 13 Aug 1946. He was renowned for his works of science fiction especially 'The Time Machine'. He is also referred as 'The Father of Science Fiction'.

Merleau-Ponty suggests that to perceive is to be “geared into” the world. In perceiving, we are related to a temporally structured modal space of bodily possibilities that is co-constituted by the body and the world. When we perceive, we are “geared into” this structure and responsive to it; when we misperceive, we are not. In misperceiving, we are unaware of our failure to be geared into the world, and in this respect, we lack awareness of what we are doing. In (...) explaining misperception via this lack of self-awareness, Merleau-Ponty anticipates a key feature of M. G. F. Martin's epistemic disjunctivism: the idea that perceptions and misperceptions can be indiscriminable because of a self-awareness we lack, rather than a set of positive phenomenal features that two experiences share. However, because Merleau-Ponty's account of self-awareness imposes relatively few cognitive demands, he is able to explain how adults, infants, and dogs can be self-aware in the same sense, and how they can fail to discriminate between their experiences in the same way. This provides Merleau-Ponty with the resources to answer Susanna Siegel's objection to epistemic disjunctivism on the basis of “cognitively unsophisticated hallucinators.”. (shrink)

Philosophy of perception has recently become one of the most important and most central sub-fields of philosophical research. The aim of this volume is to give a representative sample of the new approaches in philosophy of perception that are responsible for this explosion of philosophical interest. Perceiving the World contains eleven original essays, written specially for this book by some of the leading contemporary philosophers of perception: Jonathan Cohen, JTr(me Dokic, Fred Dretske, Andy Egan, Benj Hellie, Sean D. Kelly, M.G.F. (...) Martin, Mohan Matthen, Adam Pautz, Jesse J. Prinz, and Susanna Siegel." "Bence Nanay is BOF Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of Antwerp and Senior Research Associate at Peterhouse, University of Cambridge. He received his PhD at the University of California, Berkeley, in 2006. He has published articles in various journals on philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, and aesthetics."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

The human genome project's lasting legacies are the emerging insights into human physiology and disease, and the ascendance of biology as the dominant science of the 21st century. Sequencing revealed that >90% of the human genome is not coding for proteins, as originally thought, but rather is overwhelmingly transcribed into non‐protein coding, or non‐coding, RNAs (ncRNAs). This discovery initially led to the hypothesis that most genomic DNA is “junk”, a term still championed by some geneticists and evolutionary biologists. In contrast, (...) molecular biologists and biochemists studying the vast number of transcripts produced from most of this genome “junk” often surmise that these ncRNAs have biological significance. What gives? This essay contrasts the two opposing, extant viewpoints, aiming to explain their bases, which arise from distinct reference frames of the underlying scientific disciplines. Finally, it aims to reconcile these divergent mindsets in hopes of stimulating synergy between scientific fields. (shrink)

How can we take history seriously as real and relevant? Despite the hazards of politically dangerous or misleading accounts of the past, we live our lives in a great network of cooperation with other actors; past, present, and future. We study and reflect on the past as a way of exercising a responsibility for shared action. In each of the chapters of Full History Smith poses a key question about history as a concern for conscious participants in the sharing of (...) action, starting with “What Is Historical Meaningfulness?” and ending with “How Can History Have an Aim?” Constructing new models of historical meaning while engaging critically with perspectives offered by Ranke, Dilthey, Rickert, Heidegger, Eliade, Sartre, Foucault, and Arendt, Smith develops a philosophical account of thinking about history that moves beyond postmodernist skepticism. Full History seeks to expand the cast of significant actors, establishing an inclusive version of the historical that recognizes large-scale cumulative actions but also encourages critical revision and expansion of any paradigm of shared action. (shrink)

Hume's Reception in Early America: Expanded Edition brings together the original American responses to one of Britain's greatest men of letters, David Hume. Now available as a single volume paperback, this new edition includes updated further readings suggestions and dozens of additional primary sources gathered together in a completely new concluding section. From complete pamphlets and booklets, to poems, reviews, and letters, to extracts from newspapers, religious magazines and literary and political journals, this book's contents come from a wide variety (...) of sources published in colonial America and the early United States between 1758 and 1850. As well as classics by Thomas Jefferson, John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, it contains scores of unknown and hard-to-locate items, many of which have not been reprinted since their original publication. These responses are divided into four parts covering Hume's Essays; his Philosophical Writings; his History of England; and his Character and Death. Each of those parts has a separate introductory essay, and every selection is introduced by a short headnote that sets the piece in its historical context and provides bibliographical references. Packed with new insights into Hume and American thought and culture, Hume's Reception in Early America reveals the relevance and impact of Hume on American political, philosophical, historical, religious, and aesthetic debates. (shrink)